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The Elasticity of Taxable Income: 
Influences on Economic Efficiency 
and Tax Revenues, and Implications 
for Tax Policy 
Seth H. Giertz 
Taxes are frequently so much more burdensome to the people than 
they are beneficial to the sovereign. 
-Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations 
While research into the elasticity of taxable income (ETr), which measures 
the responsiveness of reported taxable income to changes in tax rates, dates 
back to at least Lindsey (1987), recognition of its importance as a central 
parameter for tax policy design did not begin to take hold until the second 
half of the 1990s. 1 In fact, a 1998 survey to determine public and labor 
economists' views on key policy parameters (Fuchs, Krueger, and Poterba 
1998) included no questions on the ETI. 2 I suspect that a 2008 survey 
would include such questions, just as I suspect that a 1998 conference 
entitled "Tax Policy Lessons from the 1990s" would have no session on the 
elasticity of taxable income. The two 1998 survey questions most likely 
to provide some insight into the views public economists then held of 
the ETI asked about the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) and 
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA93) on long-run 
(steady-state) gross domestic product (GDP). For TRA86 , a fundamental 
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reform that broadened the tax base and substantially lowered marginal tax 
rates, the median response was that steady-state GDP would rise by 1 per-
cent. However, the interquartile range was large, from 0.20 to 3 percent of 
GDP For OBRA93, which raised marginal tax rates for primarily upper-
income groups, the median response was zero, with an interquartile range 
from -0.5 to 1 percent of GDP It is noteworthy that half of public econo-
mists surveyed thought that raising marginal tax rates for the highest-
income groups (in 1993) would not result in decreased steady-state GDP 
Disagreement among public economists as to the effect of taxes on the 
economy is embodied by the views of two former chairmen of the president's 
Council of Economic Advisors (CEA). One former chairman, Martin Feldstein 
(l995b, 1999), estimated that the 1993 tax increases substantially increased 
deadweight loss (DWL) and that repealing the rate increases could actually 
increase tax revenue because positive behavioral responses would more than 
offset the mechanical revenue loss-that is, the loss in tax revenue absent any 
behavioral responses. Another former CEA chairman, Joseph Stiglitz (2004), 
viewed the 1993 tax increases in a quite different light: 'The Clinton experi-
ence showed that raising taxes on the rich does not have the adverse effects 
that the critics claimed" (4). Additionally, Stiglitz is very critical of the Bush tax 
cuts, while Feldstein supports the lower marginal tax rates.3 One could argue 
that the two former CEA chairmen take such different positions on recent tax 
policy because of differing political ideologies or party allegiance. However, a 
more plausible explanation is that they hold very different views of how 
responsive individuals are to changes in tax rates. Feldstein's estimates for the 
effects of repealing OBRA93 , for example, rest on an ETI estimate that is 
toward the high end of the literature-although not implausible.4 Stiglitz, on 
the other hand, while not directly speaking to the ETI, believes that behavioral 
responses to tax rates are small (at least for high-income individuals). If the ETI 
is very small, then the revenue and efficiency implications from repealing 
OBRA93 would be quite different from those estimated by Feldstein. 
Developments in Assessing the Efficiency Implications of Taxation 
Economists have long recognized that taxation creates economic inefficiency 
by distorting the price of leisure relative to that of all other goods in the 
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economy Even a broad-based income tax can have substantial efficiency 
costs, so long as leisure remains untaxed. Harberger (1964) uses this as 
motivation for comparing the efficiency implications of direct versus indi-
rect taxation and in so doing shows how labor supply elasticities can be 
used to measure the efficiency implications of income taxation. Harberger's 
analysis won over the profession and led to increased research into labor 
supply elasticities, which were seen as proxies for the efficiency costs from 
taxation. 5 More than two decades later, Lindsey (1987) examined the ETI, 
as opposed to the labor supply elasticity However, Lindsey emphasized the 
revenue implications of the ETI and not its efficiency implications. 
In addition to producing ETI estimates, Feldstein (1995b) described 
the behaviors that could affect taxable income and argued that many of 
these behaviors were not captured by labor supply elasticities. Thus, it is 
more accurate to state that taxation creates economic inefficiency not only 
by distorting the relative price of labor and leisure, but more broadly by dis-
torting the relative price of goods or activities that are taxed and those that 
are not taxed, since leisure is not the only untaxed activity For example, in 
response to taxes, not only work hours but also work effort might change. 
Compensation can shift from taxed forms to nontaxed forms. When tax 
rates are higher, more compensation is paid in tax-exempt fringe benefits 
instead of wages, and economic activity may shift from jurisdictions with 
more burdensome taxes to others where taxes are more favorable. Evasion 
is another response to taxation that confers DWL, but does not imply 
increased leisure. In response to higher tax rates, people are more likely 
to understate their incomes and to overstate their deductions. Over the long 
run, taxes also influence investment decisions, including how much edu-
cation to pursue and in what occupations to specialize. 
Feldstein (1999)6 shows that one parameter, the ETI, can capture this 
wide array of behavioral responses and can then be used to calculate both 
the efficiency and revenue implications from a change in tax rates. In fact, 
Feldstein shows that the ETI, along with information on marginal tax rates 
and income, is all that is necessary to calculate changes in both tax revenue 
and efficiency 7 In Harberger's (1964) model, labor is the only source of 
income, all income is taxed when earned, taxable income thus equals labor 
income, and the ETI with respect to the tax rate is the same as the labor 
supply elasticity-or at least the elasticity of labor earnings, since labor 
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hours and labor earnings may be imperfectly correlated due to factors such 
as work effort.8 Feldstein's model is more complex, recognizing that income 
comes from many sources and that those sources are taxed differently (or 
sometimes not taxed at all). Taxpayers can shift income, as well as alter their 
tax deductions, exclusions, and credits; some of those behaviors result in 
income escaping the tax base (gOing untaxed), while others allow taxpayers 
to shift when and under what base (for example, individual versus corpo-
rate) income is reported and taxed. Taxpayers also have some discretion 
over what share of their income is reported to the tax authorities. In this 
more realistic setting, taxable income and labor income (and their corre-
sponding tax elasticities) can differ substantially 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: In the next two 
sections I focus on important developments in ETI research, both empirical 
and theoretical, over the first decade of the twenty-first century and relate 
them to important tax issues that the United States will face over the next 
few years. Next, I examine the two most important Bush tax cuts, the 
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA) and 
the Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 OGTRRA), which 
changed our tax system in many ways, including lowering individual mar-
ginal tax rates. The tax changes, however, are not permanent-that is, for the 
most part, the federal tax system will, after 2010, revert to its 2001 state 
unless additional legislation is enacted. Thus I go on to use a range of ETI 
estimates from the literature to show how allOwing the individual income tax 
rate cuts to expire might affect economic efficiency and tax revenues. 
I find that, based on 2005 data, returning individual income tax rates 
to their 2001 levels would raise revenues by $98.6 billion, assuming no 
behavioral responses.9 At an ETI of 0.2, $15.6 billion of this mechanical 
increase ($12.2 billion from the federal income tax and $3.4 billion from 
payroll and state taxes) would be lost due to reductions in taxable income. 
At an ETI of 0.8, $62.4 billion of the mechanical revenue gain ($48.8 bil-
lion from the federal income tax and $13.6 billion from payroll and state 
taxes) would be lost. The DWL per dollar of additional revenue from the 
federal income tax is also highly sensitive to the ETI, ranging from $0.18 at 
an ETI of 0.2 to $1.25 at an ETI of 0.8.10 
I also calculate Laffer curves (which show the relationship between mar-
ginal tax rates and tax revenue) under a range of different ETI assumptions, 
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with special attention focused on the top tax bracket. There is considerable 
debate about the degree to which changes to tax rates affect revenues. My 
analysis is not intended to settle this debate, but rather to show what ETI 
assumptions are implicitly associated with the different points of view. Again, 
estimates are quite sensitive to the ETI. At an ETI of 0.2, the estimated Laffer 
tax rate for the top tax bracket is 78 percent; at an ETI of 1, the estimated 
Laffer rate is just 41 percent ---or slightly higher than the current effective 
marginal tax rate for this group. 
Developments in ETI Research since 2000 
Slemrod (2002) presents a taxonomy of the ways in which people respond 
to taxation and the costs associated with this behavior. These can be con-
densed to four broad areas: 
1) Real behavior. This involves individuals changing their consump-
tion or the amount they work, for example, by moving away 
from taxed goods or activities toward those that are untaxed 
or more lightly taxed. It also includes the shifting of income 
across tax bases or to jurisdictions where tax rates are more favor-
able. The labor supply elasticity (which measures the trade-off 
between time spent on labor and leisure) captures only a portion 
of that response. 
2) Timing of income receipt. Sammartino and Weiner (1997) show 
overall patterns of adjusted gross income (AGI) that are consistent 
with large transitory shifting at the top of the income distribution 
surrounding OBRA93. The timing of executive compensation has 
also been shown quite responsive to OBRA93 (Goolsbee 2000).11 
Changes to the tax treatment of capital gains in 1987, 1997, 
and 2003 all appear to have had a large short -term influence on 
realization behavior. (Even the timing of marriages, births, and 
deaths appears to be influenced by tax considerations.) 
3) Circumvention. This includes both illegally (evasion) and legally 
(avoidance) bypassing the tax system. In the case of evasion, 
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income is concealed or at least not reported to the tax authorit-
ies. (See Slemrod and Yitzhaki 2002 and Slemrod 2007.) In the 
case of avoidance, income is shifted (intertemporally or between 
sources) so that a taxpayer receives more favorable tax treatment. 
Diverting income into a tax-deferred retirement account is an 
example of avoidance. Higher tax rates generally increase the 
benefits from evasion and avoidance.12 
4) Response to administration and compliance policy. Rigorous enforce-
ment of tax laws and low compliance costs should limit evasion 
and lead to smaller income responses of reportable taxable 
income to tax changes. However, the benefits from such polices 
must be weighed against the government's additional costs of 
administering and enforcing the tax system, since these costs also 
represent a loss to society In contrast, lax enforcement and high 
compliance costs will tempt taxpayers to hide income, and thus 
result in larger changes in taxable income when rates change. That 
implies that, instead of structural parameters, taxable income 
elasticities are endogenous and a function of institutions. The time 
and money that taxpayers spend complying with tax laws and 
regulations are also a substantial source of deadweight loss 
(Guyton et al. 2003). 
Behavioral changes have efficiency implications. To assess them accu-
rately requires that we differentiate real behavioral changes that affect 
resource allocation from mere accounting maneuvers that simply re-label 
income. It requires that we distinguish between the shifting of activity from 
inside to outside the tax base on the one hand, and the shifting of income 
from one tax base to a different tax base on the other For example, follow-
ing the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which set the tax rate on Subchapter S 
income below that on Subchapter C income, Subchapter S income 
increased nearly threefold as income was shifted from Subchapter C corpo-
rations to Subchapter S corporations. That shift of income was simply a 
transfer from one tax base to another, but since individuals do not report 
Subchapter C income, only half of the picture was in view: the increase in 
Subchapter S income. Thus, without information on the drop in 
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Subchapter C income, the relationship between the marginal income tax 
rates and taxable personal income can have misleading implications for 
both economic efficiency and tax revenues. 
Issues That Complicate Estimation. The primary methodological objec-
tive in the empirical literature is to devise a method for separating the 
response of taxable income to changes in tax rates from responses to the 
many other factors that also affect taxable income. Tax changes take place 
in a changing economic environment, and the changes to that environment 
affect income growth. Adequately controlling for those non-tax-induced 
trends in taxable income poses a major challenge to estimating elasticities. 
In addition, a sound methodology must address several other important 
issues, including mean reversion, tax rate endogeneity, institutional changes 
(which often coincide with changes in the rate structure), and the distinc-
tion between transitory (or temporary) and permanent (or longer-term) 
responses. Finally, some behavioral responses involve externalities or 
transfers between economic agents which alter how the efficiency implica-
tions of the ETI should be interpreted. Some of the issues that complicate 
estimation are discussed in more detail below. 
Exogenous Shifts in the Income Distribution and Mean Reversion. The distribu-
tion of reported income has widened over the past thirty years. That trend 
accelerated in the 1980s, especially at the very top of the distribution. 
According to Piketty and Saez (2003), the share of income reported by the 
top 10 percent of filers rose by more than 40 percent, from 33 percent in 
1979 to 46.8 percent in 2006, with nearly two-thirds of that increase accru-
ing to the top 1 percent of taxpayers. 13 The share of income reported by the 
top one-half of 1 percent more than doubled, the share reported by the top 
one-tenth of 1 percent nearly tripled, and the share reported by the top one-
hundredth of 1 percent more than quadrupled. Because people with the 
highest income pay a disproportionate share of taxes-the top 1 percent 
pays nearly 39 percent of all federal income taxes-their behavior is espe-
cially important. 14 Not fully accounting for the portion of income growth 
unrelated to tax policy can result in large biases. For example, the cuts in 
marginal tax rates in the 1980s were greatest at the top of the income dis-
tribution and were thus inversely correlated with the great income growth 
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at the very top of the distribution. The fact that the income growth at the 
top of the income distribution is jagged (while following a decidedly 
upward trend) makes controlling for it even more difficult. If the non-tax-
related portion of that income growth is not fully accounted for, that trend 
will bias ETI estimates in a positive direction when tax rates fall (and in a 
negative direction when tax rates rise). 
Mean reversion is another issue that complicates estimation. Over a persons 
lifetime, income often follows a general path with many fluctuations. After 
a period when income is particularly high or low, it will often revert to a 
more normal path. That phenomenon is especially pronounced at the tails 
of the distribution. Those at the extreme right of the income distribution 
are often not there for long, and will likely have a substantial drop in 
income (that is unrelated to tax policy). At the other extreme, those in 
school (or not employed) will often have large increases in income upon 
entering the workforce. Not accounting for that mean reversion at the 
tails of the distribution can substantially bias estimated elasticities. More 
specifically, not fully controlling for mean reversion will erroneously count 
both non-tax-related increases (by those below their lifetime path) and 
non-tax-related decreases in taxable income (by those above their life-
time path) as responses to changes in tax rates. Those factors will bias 
ETI estimates in opposite directions, depending on whether tax rates 
are raised or lowered, but there is no reason to believe that the biases 
will cancel each other out. Partly for that reason, many studies exclude 
those with very low earnings. Those at the high end cannot be so easily dis-
carded, since they are responsible for a large share of both taxable income 
and tax revenues. 
These issues are even further complicated by the fact that the size of tax-
able income elasticity appears to vary across the income distribution. That 
is, estimated ETls are generally larger (sometimes much larger) for higher-
income groups. In such cases, Navratil (1995) shows that some of the early 
differences-in-differences approaches will produce biased estimates for each 
group. Additionally, if the ETI does in fact vary with income, a single over-
all elasticity will not be applicable when considering the impact of rate 
changes that target only part of the income distribution or that differ in 
magnitude across the distribution. 
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Endogeneity of the Tax Rate. Because of the federal tax system's progressivity, 
it is almost axiomatic that a simple cross-section regression will show a 
direct relationship between tax rates and taxable income. Even with longi-
tudinal data, an individual's tax rate rises with taxable income. In order to 
isolate the impact of taxes on taxable income, tax rates should be imputed 
based on an instrumented (or exogenous) measure of taxable income. After 
instrumenting, the correct relationship between taxable income and the tax 
rate should be achieved for each individual, but that method does not 
address the cross-sectional correlation between taxable income and tax 
rates. Studies using cross-sectional variation for identification generally 
must also include differencing methods (which transform the key depend-
ent variable to the change in the tax rate). 
Institutional Factors: Contemporaneous Tax Policy Changes. If institutional 
changes to the tax system take effect contemporaneously with rate changes, 
they could affect reported taxable income, biasing estimated elasticities, or 
at least complicating the estimation. In fact, Slemrod (1996) shows that 
changes to the underlying tax base may result in substantially different elas-
ticities before and after a tax change. Most regression techniques yield a 
weighted average of the two elasticities. 
Most elasticity measures also assume policies toward tax evasion and 
avoidance as given, when in fact those too are choices that policymakers 
can change. Recent work emphasizes the role of institutional factors 
(Slemrod and Kopczuk 2002, Kopczuk 2005) and shows that the elasticity 
of taxable income is not a structural parameter, but rather a function of the 
tax system. Taxpayers are more responsive when opportunities to avoid 
taxes are more prevalent (or less costly). Possible influences on responses to 
taxes include the availability of substitutable forms of compensation (such 
as the ability of firms to use nontaxable fringe benefits as opposed to tax-
able compensation) and the expected penalties for evasion. 
The definition of taxable income itself may influence results. Changes 
to the tax system may alter that definition. Using the concurrent definition 
for taxable income (that is, the definition that was in effect when the income 
was received) will confound responses to tax rates with statutory changes 
to the tax base. But even if a consistent measure is chosen, Slemrod (1998) 
shows that estimates may depend on the definition used and that even a 
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constant-law definition can yield biased results. And Heim (2007) shows 
that taxable income elasticities will be biased if the definition of taxable 
income changes, unless there are cross-price elasticities of zero between 
goods whose tax status changes and those that are always taxable. 
Transitory versus Permanent Responses and Income Shifting. Permanent, or 
longer-term, behavioral responses to tax changes are of primary impor-
tance; transitory responses are a lesser concern. For illustration, suppose 
that in 1986 taxpayers knew that the tax rates were set to fall in 1987. In 
the short term, some may have delayed the receipt of income from 
December 1986 to January 1987. That response would not have affected 
real economic behavior and would not have influenced long-term taxable 
income. By contrast, a longer-term response like a persistent change in 
investment or labor market behavior would have affected the allocation 
of resources and taxable income for years to come. That is not to say that 
transitory behavior is always small or trivial. For example, capital gains real-
izations rose by over 96 percent from 1985 to 1986 in anticipation of less-
favorable treatment of capital gains set to begin in 1987. 
Separating transitory from permanent responses is often difficult. 
Measuring changes in taxable income in the year prior to and the years 
succeeding a tax change will likely yield a combination of permanent and 
transitory responses. Phase-in periods and taxpayer expectations about 
future tax legislation also matter. For example, if rate cuts phase in, people 
not only divert income (on paper) to the future, but also may substitute 
leisure in the short term for work in the future when the rates are fully low-
ered. In that instance, intertemporal substitution could result in a near-term 
understatement and a longer-term overstatement of the ETI. 
A related issue is the relationship between tax policy and long-term 
career and investment decisions. Tax policy can affect investment in both 
human and physical capital, which over time can influence taxable income. 
That long-run response is important in measuring the true response to tax 
changes, but may not be fully observed for many years follOwing a tax 
change, leading to an understatement of the ETI. 
Transfers between Economic Agents. Chetty (forthcoming) warns that the large 
elasticities found for high-income groups may overstate the efficiency implica-
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tions of this groups behavior. Chetty suggests that behavioral responses by 
upper-income filers are more likely to involve "fiscal externalities"- i.e., behav-
ioral responses may reflect the shifting of economic activity to other agents in 
the economy, or in some cases sheltering income has external transfer costs-
and thus implying a difference between the private and social costs of avoiding 
taxes. Carroll (1998) notes the possibility of income shifting between economic 
agents. For example, a highly paid lawyer may reduce his workload in response 
to a tax increase targeted at high earners, but his reduction may shift business 
to lawyers in lower tax brackets. As an example of transfer costs, Chetty sug-
gests that an executive may be deterred from taking a larger share of compen-
sation in the form of fringe benefits because doing so would require offering 
more fringe benefits to other employees in the firm. Another case of transfer 
costs involves the potential for fines imposed by the IRS. The expected value of 
these fines represents a cost to a subset of taxpayers. However, this is not a 
deadweight loss to society as a whole because the cost to those evading taxes is 
exactly offset by additional revenues "transferred" to the government. 
Recent ETI Estimates. As the obstacles to identification have become better 
recognized, more sophisticated methods and richer datasets have been used 
to estimate the ETI. A striking result is that ETI estimates, while remaining 
quite sensitive to a wide array of factors, have tended downward from the ear-
liest estimates by Feldstein (199Sa) and Lindsey (1987). These first studies 
reported estimated ETIs of between 1 and 3. More recent studies report esti-
mates closer to 0.4, but estimates still range from close to 0 to greater than 1. 
In addition to displaying this sensitivity to specification decisions, estimates 
have been found to vary across time and across the income distribution. IS 
An influential study by Gruber and Saez (2002) examines taxable income 
responses to the tax cuts of 1981 and 1986 using a panel of tax returns 
for years 1979 through 1990. This approach lays the groundwork for papers 
by Kopczuk (2005), Giertz (2006, 2007), and Heim (2007, forthcoming). 
Gruber and Saez calculate constant-law income using 1990 law excluding 
capital gains and using the National Bureau of Economic Researchs TAXSIM 
model to estimate federal and state tax rates. They then apply two-stage least 
squares, regressing the log of the income growth (over three-year intervals) 
against the log change in the net-of-tax rate plus year fixed effects and dum-
mies for marital status. 16 Recognizing the possibility of mean reversion and 
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secular trends in income, they explore two additional specifications, 1) the log 
of initial period income as an independent variable; and 2) a ten-piece spline 
of the log of initial period income. 
They are most confident in an income-weighted estimated ETI of 0.40 
from the model that includes a ten-piece spline based on the natural log of 
initial period income. The spline allows the functional relationship between 
the dependent variable and the independent variables to vary by decile. 
Gruber and Saez:S (2002) corresponding elasticity for a broader measure of 
income is much smaller, 0.12, suggesting that much of the taxable income 
response comes through deductions, exemptions, and exclusions, rather than 
changes in labor supply 
Kopczuk (2005) uses the same panel as Gruber and Saez to estimate the 
ETI and to test the hypothesis that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but 
rather a function of the tax system's structure. Kopczuk models taxable 
income as a function not just of tax rates, but also of the interaction between 
tax rates and the size of the tax base, which is used as a proxy for the cost of 
shifting funds outside the tax base. Additionally, Kopczuk treats mean rever-
sion and divergence within the income distribution as separate phenomena 
by including separate variables to control for them. Kopczuk:S estimates are 
extremely sensitive to both sample selection and model specification. 
However, he does find evidence of a relationship between the size of the tax 
base and the ETI-favoring a specification which finds that a one percentage 
point increase in the tax base lowers the ETI by 0.79 percent. 
Giertz (2007) uses a panel of tax returns from 1979 to 2001 (that heavily 
oversamples high-income filers) in order to estimate taxable income and broad 
income elasticities. Applying the methods of Gruber and Saez (2002), he 
reports an estimated ETI for the 1980s that is slightly larger than that in Gruber 
and Saez, but the analogous estimate for the 1990s is less than half as large 
(0.20). FollOwing Kopczuk (2005), Giertz includes separate and nonlinear con-
trols for mean reversion and divergence within the income distribution. This 
explains about one-third of the difference between the estimates for the 1980s 
and the 1990s, lowering the 1980s estimate to 0.40 and raising the 1990s esti-
mate to 0.26. Additionally, Kopczuk:S work implies that changes to the tax base 
since 1986 could account for a portion of the remaining difference. 
Heim (2007) and Giertz (2006) use a variety of approaches to estimate 
taxable income elasticities for years covering the OBRA90 and OBRA93 tax 
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increases. Heim's preferred specification yields estimated ETIs ranging from 
0.46 to 0.58 depending on the length of the interval over which income 
changes are measured. Both papers attempt to control for adjacent-year 
income shifting when measuring behavioral changes over intervals of sev-
eral years. When measuring behavioral responses from 1991 to 1994, for 
example, controlling for adjacent-year shifting recognizes that 1991 income 
may have been influenced by income shifting between 1990 and 1991 
(since tax rates rose in 1990), and that 1994 income may have been influ-
enced by shifting between 1993 and 1994 (since tax rates rose in 1993). 
Both papers report estimates that are quite sensitive to an array of factors. 
Heim concludes that the range of estimates reported in the paper often 
"resulted from small changes in the specification, [and] includes most a pri-
ori educated guesses as to what the taxable income elasticity would be ... 
suggest [ing] that it may never be possible to pin down the taxable income 
elasticity with any reasonable degree of accuracy" (33). 
Heim (forthcoming) is one of the first to look at responses to the 2001 
and 2003 tax cuts. The paper uses a panel of individual tax returns spanning 
years 1999 to 2005. Heim measures responses over three-year intervals, 
employing controls common to the literature since Gruber and Saez (2002), 
and reports a "best estimate" of around 0.25 when not accounting for 
adjacent -year income shifting. However, much smaller and statistically 
insignificant estimates are reported when accounting for adjacent -year shift-
ing' causing him to conclude that most of the response to the tax changes was 
intertemporal (or transitory) income shifting. The large estimated coefficients 
on the adjacent-year tax rates are somewhat puzzling in this instance. With 
tax rates rising, there is an incentive to shift income to an earlier period. This 
would likely involve shifting of income from 2003 to 2002. Marginal tax rates 
for moderate- and upper-income groups fell only slightly prior to 2003, but 
fell substantially in 2003 whenJGTRRA passed, expediting the rate cuts that 
had been scheduled to phase in over the next few years. However, the 2003 
rate cuts were a surprise. For such an unanticipated drop in rates, there would 
be no (or very little) opportunity to shift income backward. 
Auten, Carroll, and Gee (2008) also use tax return data from 1999 to 
2005 to measure behavioral responses to the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts. They 
compare behavior over two-year intervals and restrict their sample to filers 
ages twenty-five to sixty-one with more than $50,000 in taxable income. 
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Instead of controlling for mean reversion and divergence in the income distri-
bution by using a function of base-year (or lagged) taxable income, they include 
variables on financial income, proxies for entrepreneurship, and regional and 
occupational dummies. In addition, they include functions of age and number 
of children in the family They report a population-weighted estimated ETI of 
0.35 (almost identical to their income-weighted estimate). Including taxpayers 
over age sixty-one lowers their estimate to 0.28. Restricting the sample to those 
with incomes over $200,000 raises their ETI estimate to 1.09. 
In another paper looking at recent tax changes, Singleton (2007) focus-
es on EGTRRAs provision designed to reduce the marriage penalty He uses 
Current Population Survey data linked to Social Security earnings records 
to examine behavioral responses to this provision, which substantially low-
ered marginal tax rates (MTRs) for married couples with taxable income 
ranging from $46,700 to $54,193 (in 2002 dollars). This provision did not 
alter MTRs for single filers or filers with incomes above or below this range. 
Singleton reports overall estimated elasticities that range from 0.16 to 0.66, 
with estimates varying by education and other demographics. These esti-
mates are for earned income and not fully taxable income. 
Most of the recent empirical ETI research has relied on panel data. An 
exception is Saez (2004), who builds on work by Slemrod (1996) and 
Feenberg and Poterba (1993) by using aggregated time-series data spanning 
1960 to 2000. Saez uses a consistent definition of income (that more 
closely approximates AGI less capital gains, as opposed to taxable income) 
and average marginal tax rates for different income groups. Saez's study 
does not focus primarily on a single tax change, but examines the respons-
es to all tax changes over the past four decades. 
Regressing the log of taxable income against the log of the net -of-tax 
rate plus a time-trend polynomial results in a statistically insignificant esti-
mated ETI of 0.20. For the top 1 percent of the taxable income distribution, 
Saez reports a much larger and statistically significant ETI estimate of 0.50. 
Corresponding ETI estimates for the bottom 99 percent of the distribution 
are negative (but not statistically different from 0). 
Saez reports estimated ETIs that vary greatly over some subsets of the forty 
years examined. For example, dividing the change in log income between 
1981 and 1984 by the change in logged net-of-tax rates between the same two 
years yields an estimated ETI of 0.77. The same analysis comparing 1985 to 
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1988 yields a much larger estimated ETI, 1.7. Comparing 1991 with 1994 
yields an estimated ETI of about o. The variation in ETIs over time is consis-
tent with Goolsbee (1999) and Giertz (2007), who both find very different 
elasticities when employing identical techniques to different time periods. 
Saez (2004) also employs a regression framework that uses taxable 
income shares to estimate ETIs for different segments of the taxable income 
distribution. Special attention is paid to the top 1 percent of filers. For the 
various taxable income groups, Saez regresses the log of the group's share 
of taxable income against the log of the net-of-tax rate. Without any time 
trends, that regression yields an estimated ETI of 1.58 for the top 1 percent. 
Including both the time trend and square of the time trend yields an esti-
mated ETI of 0.62. Saez expresses confidence in the 0.62 estimate because 
that regression has an adjusted coefficient of determination of 0.98, and the 
fitted values do an excellent job of tracking the trend in the share of income 
reported by the top 1 percent. 
Further segmentation of the income distribution shows that, even 
among the top 1 percent of the distribution, estimated ETIs vary greatly by 
income. In fact, the same approach that yields 0.62 for the top 1 percent 
yields an estimated ETI of 1.09 for the top 0.01 of 1 percent. For those in 
the ninetieth to ninety-fifth percentiles, the same approach yields a negative 
(although statistically insignificant) estimated ETI. 
Applying the ETI for Tax Policy 
Saez (2004) presents a method for assessing the revenue and efficiency 
implications resulting from changes in marginal tax rates. That method is 
described in this section and applied in the following section. 17 Saez, build-
ing on the work of Feldstein (1999), breaks the change in revenues result-
ing from an increase in tax rates on the top tax bracket into a mechanical 
and behavioral response, such that 
[ ( z ) ( EMTR )]18 L1revenue = N • MMTR • (z - z)· 1 - ETI· (z _ z) • 1 _ EMTR (1) 
Here, z is average taxable income for those in the top rate bracket, Z is 
the level of taxable income where the top tax rate kicks in, and N is the 
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number of taxpayers in the top bracket. EMIR is the effective marginal tax 
rate-the share of an additional dollar of income that is paid to the gov-
ernment- and EII is the elasticity of taxable income. The first part of equa-
tion (1), N • i1EMIR • (z - z), equals the mechanical response, or the change 
in tax revenue assuming no behavioral responses. Thus, if EII equals 0, 
there is no behavioral response, and tax revenue increases linearly with the 
tax rate. The second piece inside the brackets, 
ETI. (_z_).( EMTR ) 
(z - z) 1 - EMTR ' 
is the share of the mechanical response that is offset by changes in behavior. 
If this share is greater than 1, it implies a Laffer response-that is, an increase 
in the MTR results in a decrease in tax revenue. Note that the Laffer (or rev-
enue-maximizing) rate equals 
Note also that rearranging equation (1) to highlight revenue changes from 
the mechanical and behavioral responses yields 
I Mechanical Response I Behavioral Response or Marginal Deadweight Loss 
( 
EMTR ) ~Revenue = N .MMTR • (z - z) - ETI . MMTR • N .z 1 _ EMTR' (2) 
Finally; the behavioral response is also exactly equal to the change in 
DWL resulting from the tax rate change. 19 The behavioral response from 
equation (2) encompasses revenue changes from the federal, payroll, and 
state tax bases combined--even for a tax increase in just the federal rate-
because the bases overlap. By imputing income at the new tax rates, z', where 
z'=z· (l-ETI·(l_~TR))' (3) 
one can calculate the overall revenue offset to the individual income tax 
separately from the overall change in revenues. Thus, when behavioral 
responses are accounted for, the change in federal income tax revenue from 
raising the rate on the top income tax bracket can be expressed such that 
Mederal Revenue = N· (MMTR. (z'- z) - federaLEMTR • (z - z') ) (4) 
Note that total efficiency costs from the tax system, as opposed to the incre-
mental costs of a change in rates, can be expressed such that 
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( 
EMTR2) N Deadweight Loss = 0.5 • • ETI • L (z - z), 
l-EMTR i=l 
(5) 
which is analogous to the usual Harberger DWL formula. Other things 
being equal, tax increases for upper-income groups will result in greater 
DWL because these groups face higher EMTRs and because the DWL 
increases by the square of the tax rate. 
Data and Institutional Background 
One of the most significant economic policy initiatives of the Bush admin-
istration has been lowering marginal tax rates on ordinary individual 
income, as well as rates on capital gains and dividends. In order to garner 
enough political support for the tax cuts, the administration agreed to 
labyrinthine legislation, in which most of the provisions phase in and 
phase out (or end abruptly) between 2001 and 2011. These tax changes 
remain a hotly contested issue, in part because they are set to expire after 
2010, at which time tax rates will revert to their 2001 levels, but also 
because of America's long-term fiscal outlook: absent substantial changes, 
government expenditures are projected to exceed revenues at an unprece-
dented rate. 
The centerpiece of the Bush tax cuts was the Economic Growth Tax 
Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001, which lowered marginal tax rates and 
expanded allowable credits and deductions. This was followed by the 2003 
Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, which accelerated the mar-
ginal rate cuts from EGTRRA that were not set to fully phase in until 2006. 
Additionally, JGTRRA substantially lowered tax rates on capital gains and 
dividends. Another provision of EGTRRA reduced the marriage penalty 
by expanding the size of the 15 percent tax bracket for married filers 
only20 Table 5-1 shows the marginal tax rate schedules (for the individual 
income tax) before EGTRRA and after JGTRRA. For those at the 28 percent 
statutory rate and above, marginal income tax rates are scheduled to rise 
by roughly 10 percent after 2010. The consequences of letting these tax 
cuts expire (as measured both in terms of tax revenue and in terms of 
economic efficiency) is the focus of the next section. 
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TABLE 5-1 
FEDERAL INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SCHEDULE (IN 2005 DOLLARS) 
2000 &: 2011 2003-2010 Single Married Filing Married Filing Head of 
Tax Rates Tax Rates Filers Jointlya Separately Household 
15% 10% 0-$7,300 0-$14,600 0-$7,300 0-$10,450 
15%b 15% $7,301- $14,601- $7,301- $10,451-
$29,700 $59,400 $29,700 $39,800 
28% 25% $29,701- $59,401- $29,701- $39,801-
$71,950 $119,950 $59,975 $102,800 
31% 28% $71,951- $119,951- $59,976- $102,801-
$150,150 $182,800 $91,400 166,450 
36% 33% $150,151- $182,801- $91,401- $166,451-
$326,450 $326,450 $163,225 $326,450 
39.6% 35% $326,451 $326,451 $163,226 $326,451 
or more or more or more or more 
SOL"RCE: IRS tax schedules. 
NOTES: a. The same schedule applies to qualifying widows/widowers; b. This assumes that the 
marriage penalty relief will be extended. 
The difference between the projected 2011 rate schedule and the sched-
ule for 2003-2010 is the percentage point change in the tax rate for each 
group of taxpayers. More specifically, this is the change in statutory MTRs. 
Because I am looking at the effect of allowing the individual rates to rise 
while maintaining other features of the tax system, I assume that this also 
represents the projected change in the effective marginal tax rate. However, 
the EMTR-as noted earlier, the share of an additional dollar of income that 
is paid to the government-is often somewhat different from the statutory 
MTR because the EMTR takes into account phase-ins, phaseouts, and other 
interactions with the IRS code. These other factors affect the actual share of 
income that the government receives. 
Consider the personal exemption phaseout (PEP), which requires tax-
payers to reduce their personal exemption by 3 percent for each dollar that 
their income exceeds the phaseout floor (until the personal exemption is 
reduced to zero). Thus, taxable income increases by $103 for every additional 
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TABLE 5-2 
EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES FOR 2005 (PERCENTAGES) 
Statutory Bracket Federal EMTR Payroll EMTR State EMTR Total EMTR 
0 -1.6 13.5 0.9 12.7 
10 14.8 12.8 2.6 30.2 
15 16.3 12.5 6.1 34.9 
25 26.3 10.0 3.7 40.0 
28 30.1 5.3 3.7 39.0 
33 34.7 3.2 3.5 41.3 
35 34.7 2.5 3.4 40.7 
SOURCE: CBO 2005. 
$100 of income within the phaseout range. The EMTR is then equal to the 
MTR plus 0.03 times the MTR, or for someone in the 35 percent tax bracket, 
36.05 percent (that is, 1.03 times 35). According to CBO (2005), when all 
the intricacies of the tax code are taken into account, the range of EMTRs for 
the individual income tax is from -1.6 percent (for those often not paying 
income tax, but sometimes receiving refundable tax credits such as the Earned 
Income Tax Credit) to almost 35 percent (for the top two statutory tax brack-
ets). These findings are presented in table 5-2. Table 5-2 also shows what hap-
pens when payroll and state taxes are included. While the individual income 
tax hits upper-income groups the hardest (at the margin), federal payroll taxes 
(used to finance Social Security and Medicare) hit lower-income groups the 
hardest. EMTRs for state taxes are greatest for middle-income groups. When 
these three taxes are combined, EMTRs range from just over 30 per-cent for the 
10 percent bracket to over 41 percent for the 33 percent bracket.21 
While these EMTRs account for the intricacies of the tax system, they 
are based on standard convention, which assumes that marginal income is 
earned income. (I exclude filers whose top MTR is from capital gains.) 
However, marginal rates could differ from imputed EMTRs, if behavior at 
the margin includes changes to fringe benefits, perquisites, itemized deduc-
tions or business income. For example, with respect to earned income, 
payroll taxes are likely relevant at the margin, but payroll taxes would not 
be relevant for responses to itemized deductions or many (but not all) 
fringe benefits. If a portion of behavioral responses includes some of 
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TABLE 5-3 
2005 INDIVIDUAL INCOME AND TAX REVENUES BY TAX BRACKET 
Statutory Income Tax Revenue Tax Revenue 
MTR (%) Income Total at MTR Total atMTR 
10 130,864 107,061 12,612 10,706 
15 1,028,305 589,969 132,330 88,495 
25 1,411,064 241,641 237,515 60,410 
28 503,828 36,360 104,491 10,181 
33 387,519 79,067 92,352 26,092 
35 1,094,230 565,392 315,443 197,887 
Total 4,555,810 1,619,489 894,743 393,772 
Source: IRS 2007. 
NOTE: Dollar values are in millions. 
these changes, then true EMTRs would be lower than those reported in 
table 5-2. However, it is unlikely that this would have much effect on 
prospective change in MTRs resulting from the expiration of EGTRRA and 
JGTRRA after 2010. 
In addition to the information on EMTRs by tax bracket, two other 
pieces of information are crucial for employing the formulae (laid out ear-
lier) that estimate the revenue and efficiency implications of allOwing the 
individual tax rates to expire. We need to know both the ETI and the cor-
responding information on the amount of taxable income that is reported 
in each of the individual income tax brackets. The income information is 
published by the IRS and is summarized in table 5-3.22 
Table 5-3 shows nearly $4.6 trillion in (modified) taxable income and 
nearly $900 billion in total tax revenue for 2005. These numbers are some-
what smaller than the actual totals for 2005 because they exclude filers 
whose top MTR is for income from capital gains.23 
The final piece of information, the ETI, is the trickiest. As discussed 
above, the empirical literature on the ETI suggests a wide range of plausi-
ble estimates, and considerable disagreement surrounds the size of this 
parameter. Thus the next section shows how the expiring cuts in individ-
ual MTRs might affect revenue and efficiency under a range of different 
ETIs. This approach aims to show what implicit views of the ETI may 
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underlie different views on tax policy-especially views on the relationship 
between rate changes and revenues. Additionally; it highlights the sensitiv-
ity of revenue estimates to a range of ETI assumptions. 
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. The results that follow are 
not from a full micro simulation model with behavioral responses made at the 
individual level. There are a number of reasons why results from such an exer-
cise might differ from those presented in the next section. First, EMTRs differ 
within a statutory tax bracket, while here the average EMTR is applied to 
aggregated taxable income for each of the respective tax brackets. Second, 
some individuals are close to the bottom of their tax bracket, which would 
likely censor behavioral responses to a rise in the brackets tax rate. Saez (2002) 
finds that while taxpayers by and large do not bunch at the kinks, there are 
still some who are near kink points. Because I am not using individual-level 
data, I do not censor responses. Third, income measures are taken from table 
3.4 of IRS (2007), which groups filers by their top MTR. I exclude taxpayers 
whose top tax rate is for capital gains inconle. Some taxpayers, however, have 
capital gains income that is taxed at a rate lower than their top rate. This 
income may be included in my measure. Finally; I apply EMTRs for labor (that 
is, earned) income when estimating behavioral responses. The EMTR may be 
the best choice here, but it is imprecise. Some income, at the margin, may 
result from realizing capital gains; other income, at the margin, may be busi-
ness income that is exempt from payroll taxes. Even if responses represent 
changes to earned income, EMTRs can vary depending on which member of 
the tax unit is reporting the additional income. Moreover, responses may 
reflect changes to itemized deductions, in which case the EMTR should 
exclude payroll taxes. The decision to use EMTRs for earned income may 
disproportionately bias responses for top tax brackets, since a larger share of 
this groups income comes from sources other than labor. However, the 
EMTR from the payroll tax is just 2.5 percent for high-income groups, where-
as it exceeds 12.5 percent for the bottom two brackets. The choice of which 
EMTR to use is problematic even when using individual-level panel data. 
Despite these caveats, this is a useful exercise that illustrates the range 
of revenue responses and efficiency consequences resulting from the expi-
ration of the Bush tax cuts. It also shows that these questions can be 
broached even by those who do not have access to confidential tax 
returns-in other words, the vast majority of scholars. 
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Revenue and Efficiency Implications of Expiring Tax Legislation 
The mechanical change in revenues from allowing the individual rates to 
expire-that is, the change in individual income tax revenues assuming no 
behavioral responses-is estimated here at $98.6 billion.24 (See table 5-4.) 
That is 13 percent greater than actual 2005 revenues.25 For the mechanical 
calculation, only revenues from the individual income tax change, since the 
mechanical calculation ignores taxable income responses to the change in 
rates. Behavioral responses, though, lower revenues from the individual 
income tax and from payroll and state taxes (which further offsets revenue 
increases from the individual income tax), since these bases overlap. About 
38 percent of the mechanical revenue increase results from changing the 10 
percent tax bracket back to IS percent. This has the biggest effect both 
because the rate on this bracket is scheduled to undergo the largest percent-
age point increase, and because the increase in rates increases revenues not 
just from those facing this marginal rate, but also from filers in all the higher 
brackets (who pay this rate on some of their income). The 35 percent rate 
bracket, which is slated to rise to 39.6, is the second most important in terms 
of the expected mechanical increase in revenues. This bracket accounts for 
nearly 23 percent (or $26 billion) of the expected increase in revenues. In 
contrast to what occurs when the 10 percent bracket is raised, here, all the 
additional revenue is from filers in this marginal rate bracket. Although less 
than 1 percent of filers face this top bracket, this group reported over half of 
one trillion dollars in 2005 taxable income (IRS 2007). 
Projecting tax revenues under a range of ETI estimates shows the extent 
to which behavioral responses might reduce the mechanical gain in tax rev-
enues. Recall that this difference between the mechanical and actual change 
in revenues is also equal to the efficiency cost (or deadweight loss) result-
ing from the tax increase. As figure 5-1, figure 5-2, and table 5-5 show, a 
modest ETI of 0.2 would lower the gain in federal income tax revenues by 
more than 12 percent (or $12.2 billion, from $98.6 billion to $86.5 billion) 
compared to the mechanical gain. (When payroll and state taxes are 
accounted for, the revenue offset and total DWL rise nearly 28 percent, to 
$15.6 billion.) A large ETI of 1.0 would wipe away 62 percent (or $60.9 
billion) of the revenue gain, and an additional 17 percent (or $17 billion) 
would be lost from payroll and state revenues. Revenues from filers in the 
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2005 
MTR 
10% 
15% 
25% 
28% 
33% 
35% 
Total 
TABLE 5-4 
EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF LETTING THE BUSH 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CUTS EXPIRE 
Behavioral Response = Change in DWL 
Mechanical ~ ETI= 
Revenue 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 
43,015 555 1,100 1,473 1,745 2,290 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
17,293 5,364 10,708 13,376 16,053 21,398 
5,772 1,719 3,440 4,307 5,167 6,888 
6,522 1,567 3,123 3,901 4,689 6,246 
26,041 6,392 12,795 15,972 19,157 25,535 
98,643 15,596 31,167 39,029 46,811 62,357 
SOCRCE: Author's calculations. 
NOTES: Dollar values are in millions of 2005 dollars; N/A = not applicable. 
I/) 
I: 
~ 
iii 
$95 
$85 
$75 
$65 
$55 
$45 
$35 
$25 
$15 
$5 
-$5 
-$15 
-$25 
FIGURE 5-1 
CHANGE IN TAX REVENUES RESULTING FROM THE EXPIRATION 
OF CUTS IN INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL TAX RATES 
Total Mechanical Change in Tax Revenues = $98, 643 
ETI = 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 
D Federal Income Tax Revenue • Payroll and State Tax Revenue 
SOURCE: Author's calculations. 
1.0 
2,835 
N/A 
26,742 
8,602 
7,808 
31,907 
77,894 
124 TAX POLICY LESSONS FROM THE 2000s 
FIGURE 5-2 
CHANGE IN DEADWEIGHT Loss RESULTING FROM THE EXPIRATION OF 
CUTS IN INDIVIDUAL MARGINAL TAX RATES 
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15 percent bracket rise by $21.9 billion under each scenario, even though 
their MTR is not scheduled to change when the cuts expire.26 Members of 
this group pay more in taxes because their taxable income that was below 
the 15 percent rate was taxed at 10 percent, but would be taxed at 15 per-
cent. It is assumed that there are no income effects and thus that this group 
does not change its behavior. At an ETI of o. 5-halfway between the 
extremes already discussed-the increase in federal revenues from the tax 
increase is 45 percent (or $30.5 billion) smaller than under the mechanical 
case, and an additional 28 percent (or $8.5 billion) would be lost from pay-
roll and state revenues. As shown in table 5-5 , the one-year revenue gain in 
federal income taxes from the expiration of the cuts in individual tax rates 
would equal $98.6 billion with no behavioral response; $86.5 billion when 
assuming an ETI of 0.2; and $37.8 billion when assuming an ETI of l. 
In each case, 36 percent of the reduction in federal income tax revenues 
(compared to the mechanical case) results from behavioral responses by 
those 0.7 percent of filers in the top income tax bracket. Forty-four percent 
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TABLE 5-5 
REVENUE CONSEQUENCES OF LETTING THE BUSH 
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX CUTS EXPIRE 
Total Revenue Change = Mechanical Change - DWL 
2005 Mechanical ~ ETI= 
MTR Revenue 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 
10% Income tax 43,015 42,732 42,449 42,208 42,066 41,783 41,501 
Other bases N/A -272 -534 -666 -796 -1,058 -1,321 
15% Income tax N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Other bases N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
25% Income tax 17,293 13,641 10,000 8,178 6,348 2,708 -937 
Other bases N/A -1,712 -3,415 -4,261 -5,108 -6,812 -8,512 
28% Income tax 5,772 4,411 3,055 2,378 1,700 343 -1,013 
Other bases N/A -358 -724 -912 -1,095 -1,458 -1,817 
33% Income tax 6,522 5,192 3,863 3,198 2,534 1,205 -123 
Other bases N/A -237 -465 -578 -701 -929 -1,163 
35% Income tax 26,041 20,480 14,909 12,183 9,417 3,887 -1,647 
Other bases N/A -831 -1,663 -2,114 -2,533 -3,381 -4,219 
Income tax 98,643 86,456 74,277 68,145 62,065 49,925 37,780 
Total Other bases N/A -3,409 -6,801 -8,531 -10,234 -13,639 -17,032 
Source: Author's calculations. 
NOTES: Dollar values are in millions of 2005 dollars; NI A = not applicable. 
of the reduction in federal income tax revenues is attributable to the 1.8 
percent of filers in the top two tax brackets. If the ETI increases with 
income, as the empirical literature suggests, these shares would be even 
larger. Some have suggested returning rates to their 2001 levels for just the 
top two tax brackets. At an ETI of 0.5, this would imply just $15.4 billion 
more in annual revenues (from the federal income tax) and $19.9 billion in 
increased DWL. At an ETI of 0.2, federal income tax revenues would be 
expected to increase by $25.7 billion, with $8 billion in additional DWL. 
At an ETI of 1, the tax increase would move the top two tax brackets past 
their Laffer (or revenue-maximizing) rate. Thus this would actually lead to 
a reduction in overall revenues and an increase in DWL. 
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Marginal Deadweight Loss. The changes in revenues and in DWL from 
changes in tax policy can be combined into a measure that captures the 
increase in DWL associated with a one-dollar increase in revenues (or, for 
a tax cut, the reduction in DWL associated with a one-dollar reduction in 
revenues). This measure of marginal DWL simply equals the change in rev-
enues divided by the change in DWL. As tables 5-6a and 5-6b show, ranges 
in ETI of 0.2 to 1 imply a tremendous range in the efficiency costs associ-
ated with raising additional revenue (by allowing MTRs to return to their 
2001 levels). At an ETI of 0.2, for example, allowing the tax cuts to expire 
would result in a marginal DWL (per dollar of federal income tax revenue) 
of $0 . IS-that is, for each additional dollar the federal government receives 
in revenue, society would be worse off by $O.IS. At an ETI of 1, the mar-
ginal DWL rises to $2.06 per additional dollar of income tax revenue raised. 
At an ETI of 0.5, this number is $0.57. When revenue offsets to the other 
tax bases are accounted for, the marginal DWL rises by just 4 percent at an 
ETI of 0.2, but by S2 percent at an ETI of 1.0. 
For comparison, consider the use in Feldstein (999) of an individual-
level microsimulation model to assess the possible implications of a 10 per-
cent increase in marginal tax rates. Feldstein concludes that, assuming an 
ETI of 1.04, behavioral responses would erase over two-thirds of the 
mechanical gain in tax revenues and that the marginal DWL would be over 
$2 per every additional dollar of revenue. Using more recent data and 
assuming an ETI of 0.4, Feldstein (200S) reports a marginal DWL of $0.76 
per additional dollar of revenue raised. At an ETI of 0.4, my estimated DWL 
is smaller, at $0.42 per dollar of federal income tax revenue, but it rises to 
$0.62 when I account for revenue offsets to the payroll tax and to the states. 
Note that Feldstein is considering a case where rates for each bracket 
increase by the same percentage. The case examined here is different, since 
brackets change by different percentages and one group (those currently in 
the 15 percent bracket) experiences no change in its MTR. 
For a given ETI, the efficiency implications of raising tax rates vary 
greatly across the brackets. Those in the 15 percent tax bracket drive down 
the overall DWL per dollar measure because this group is assumed to have 
no behavioral response (since its MTR does not change); but it does pay 
more in taxes because the 10 percent bracket rises to 15 percent. Raising the 
bottom 00 percent) tax bracket has only minor efficiency implications. The 
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TABLE 5-6a 
MARGINAL DEADWEIGHT Loss 
(PER ADDITIONAL DOLLAR OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX REVENUE) 
2005 ETI = 
MTR 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 
10% 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.07 
15% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
25% 0.39 1.07 1.64 2.53 7.90 N/A 
28% 0.39 1.13 1.81 3.04 20.09 N/A 
33% 0.30 0.81 1.22 1.85 5.19 N/A 
35% 0.31 0.86 1.31 2.03 6.57 N/A 
Total 0.18 0.42 0.57 0.75 1.25 2.06 
SOURCE: Author's calculations. 
TABLE 5-6b 
MARGINAL DEADWEIGHT Loss 
(PER ADDITIONAL DOLLAR OF REVENUE INCLUDING 
REVENUE OFFSETS FROM PAYROLL AND STATE TAXES) 
2005 ETI = 
MTR 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 1.0 
lO% 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 
15% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
25% 0.45 1.63 3.41 12.95 N/A N/A 
28% 0.42 1.48 2.94 8.54 N/A N/A 
33% 0.32 0.92 1.49 2.56 22.65 N/A 
35% 0.33 0.97 1.59 2.78 50.49 N/A 
Total 0.19 0.46 0.65 0.90 1.72 3.75 
SOCRCE: Author's calculations. 
marginal DWL per dollar of revenue ranges from $0.01 at an ETI of 0.2 to 
$0.07 at an ETI of 1. This is partly because those in the lower tax brackets 
face a lower EMTR than those in the higher brackets and because the DWL 
increases by the square of the EMTR. Another reason for the low efficiency 
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costs is that much of the additional revenue comes from those in higher tax 
brackets, who have income taxed in this bracket as well. Since the marginal 
income for these higher-income groups is in another tax bracket, their 
behavior is not affected by the rate changes (in lower brackets).27 
For those in the 25 to 35 percent brackets, the marginal DWL measures 
are much larger. In a case where the tax cuts expire for only the top two 
brackets and we assume an ETI of 0.5, the result is a marginal DWL of 
$1.30 per dollar of revenue. However, at an ETI of 0.2, the marginal DWL 
is over 75 percent smaller. The marginal DWL per additional dollar of 
revenue is greatest for the 25 and 28 percent brackets. Raising rates on 
this group results in behavioral responses that lower revenues, while the 
"windfall" revenue from those in higher brackets (that is not associated 
with any additional DWL) is small because there are so few filers in the top 
two brackets. 
Laffer Curves. It is widely accepted that behavioral responses to taxation (as 
measured by the ETI) act to offset revenue gains from an increase in tax rates 
and revenue losses from a decrease in rates. The degree to which this occurs, 
however, is a hotly contested issue. If higher tax rates cause less income to be 
reported, the result can be a net reduction in revenues. At one extreme, the 
government will receive no tax revenue at a 0 percent tax rate. At a tax rate of 
100 percent, the government may also receive no (or at least very little) rev-
enue. Thus, the revenue-maximizing, or Laffer, rate must be somewhere 
between 0 and 100. While the Laffer rate "optimizes" revenue collection 
(given other institutions in the economy), it should not be confused with an 
optimal tax rate, which economists use to describe the rate that raises a given 
amount of revenue with the fewest distortions to the economy 
The curve which shows the relationship between tax revenue and tax 
rates has borne the eponym "Laffer" for thirty years. The idea is much older, 
however. It was formally presented by French engineer and economist Jules 
Dupuit in the 1840s; and as early as the fourteenth century, the polymath 
Ibn Khaldun wrote: "At the beginning of the dynasty, taxation yields a large 
revenue from small assessments. At the end of the dynasty, taxation yields 
a small revenue from large assessments. "28 
Table 5-7 reports Laffer rates for each of the 2005 tax brackets under 
the various ETI assumptions. Laffer rates are very high at the bottom brack-
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TABLE 5-7 
LAFFER RATES UNDER A RANGE OF DIFFERENT ETI ASSUMPTIONS 
2005 2005 ETI = 
MTR EMTR 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 O.S 1.0 
10% 0.302 0.972 0.946 0.934 0.922 0.899 0.878 
15% 0.349 0.871 0.772 0.731 0.695 0.631 0.579 
25% 0.400 0.692 0.530 0.475 0.430 0.362 0.312 
28% 0.390 0.693 0.531 0.476 0.431 0.363 0.313 
33% 0.413 0.754 0.605 0.551 0.506 0.434 0.380 
35% 0.407 0.775 0.634 0.581 0.536 0.464 0.410 
SOURCE: Author:S calculations. 
NOTES: Rates that would maximize combined revenue from federal income taxes, state taxes, and pay-
roll taxes. 
ets because much of the revenue raised from these rates comes from filers 
in higher brackets. Laffer rates for the upper-income brackets are much 
lower and are quite sensitive to the ETI. At an ETI of 0.2, the revenue-
maximizing rate from the top bracket is 77.5 percent-well above the cur-
rent EMTR of 40.7 percent. At an ETI of 1, the picture is quite different, 
with the Laffer rate just slightly above the current EMTR. Note that these 
are the Laffer rates that would maximize combined tax revenue from the 
federal income tax, state income taxes, and federal payroll taxes. The rates 
that would maximize federal income tax revenue alone would be higher 
than those reported in table 5-7. This is especially true under the higher 
ETI assumptions, where offsetting revenues from an increase in federal rates 
can be substantial 
Figure 5-3 plots the full Laffer curves for the top tax bracket under each 
of the ETI assumptions. The curves are generated under the assumption 
that the ETI is constant across all tax rates (on a given curve). In reality, lit-
tle can be known about the ETI at rates far from those seen in the data. In 
any event, the curves illustrate the dramatic difference in the relationship 
between tax rates and tax revenues across a range of ETIs present in the lit-
erature. For comparison, the diagonal line shows the relationship with no 
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FIGURE 5-3 
LAFFER CURVES FOR VARIOUS TAXABLE INCOME ELASTICITIES 
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behavioral responses-implying that tax revenue increases linearly with tax 
rates, and no Laffer point is ever reached. 
Conclusion 
This chapter reviews recent literature on the ETI, highlighting important 
theoretical and empirical findings. In terms of theory, the ETI has been 
shown to be one of the central parameters for measuring the efficiency costs 
of the tax system and for measuring the revenue implications of tax 
changes. That said, recent research highlights instances when the ETI accu-
rately captures the efficiency implications from a tax change and when the 
parameter may overstate or understate these consequences. Other research 
has shown that the ETI is not a structural parameter, but rather a function 
of institutional features that policymakers may have under their control. On 
the empirical side, recent research suggests that the ETI is substantially 
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smaller than early estimates of it by Feldstein (1995a) and Lindsey (1987) 
and that the Ell increases with income. Recent research also finds Ell esti-
mates to be quite sensitive to an array of factors, and the range of plausible 
estimates is therefore broad. 
Based on 2005 data, I estimate that returning individual income tax 
rates to their 2001 levels would raise revenues by $98.6 billion dollars, 
assuming no behavioral responses. At an Ell of 0.2, $12.2 billion (or 12 
percent) of this mechanical increase in federal income tax revenue would 
be lost due to reductions in taxable income. Another $3.4 billion in revenue 
would be lost from payroll and state taxes. At an Ell of 0.8, $48.8 billion 
(or 49 percent) of the mechanical revenue gain would be lost. Another 
$13.6 billion in revenue would be lost from payroll and state taxes. Ihe 
DWL per dollar of additional revenue from the federal income tax is also 
highly sensitive to the Ell; it ranges from $0.18 at an Ell of 0.2 to $1.25 
at an Ell of 0.8. 
Laffer rates for each tax bracket and Laffer curves for the top tax brack-
et are sensitive to the range of Ell estimates found in the literature. An Ell 
of 0.2 implies a Laffer tax rate for the top tax bracket of 78 percent. On the 
other hand, at an Ell of 1, the estimated Laffer rate is just 41 percent, or 
slightly higher than the current effective marginal tax rate for this group. 
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Notes 
1. Specifically, the ETI equals the percentage change in reported taxable income 
associated with a 1 percent increase in the net-of-tax rate, where the net-of-tax rate 
equals the share of the next dollar of reported taxable income that is not taxed, or 1 
minus the marginal tax rate. 
2. The survey did include questions on labor supply elasticities and narrower 
questions regarding behavioral responses to taxation. 
3. Most tax legislation, and especially the Bush tax cuts, encompass more than 
simple changes to the rate structure. Some opposition, or support, for tax measures 
may be due to those other factors, and not necessarily to the changes to marginal tax 
rates. 
4. While the estimate is toward the high end of the current literature, it was less 
so at the time Feldstein was writing. 
5. Specifically, it is the compensated elasticity (or the substitution component of 
the overall elasticity) that is important for measuring efficiency Compensated elastic-
ities measure the portion of the overall response attributable to changes in relative 
prices (as opposed to the portion of the response due to changes in income). It is the 
distortion in relative prices that leads to losses in efficiency 
6. An NBER working paper version of the 1999 article was released several years 
earlier, in 1995. This earlier version influenced researchers prior to the publication of 
the 1999 version and contains different policy simulations than the later version. 
7. There are exceptions when assessing efficiency and revenue implications from 
a tax change that is complex. For example, suppose tax rates rise and, in response, 
taxable income falls, but a portion of that drop in taxable income is due to increased 
charitable contributions (and suppose those charities produce positive externalities). 
Or, suppose that a tax increase is used to finance an underprovided public good. 
In instances such as those, where external costs or benefits are present, assessing effi-
ciency implications is more complex. 
8. However, Harberger does separately examine the effects of taxing savings. 
9. This is not a revenue projection for 2011, but rather applies projected 2011 
rates to 2005 data. A projection for 2011 would account for expected income growth 
through 2011, as well as other factors that would affect revenues. 
10. When offsets to revenue from payroll and state taxes are taken into account, the 
range is from $0.19 to $1.72. 
11. However, Hall and Liebman (2000) suggest that the large transitory response 
observed by Goolsbee (2000) could reflect the exercising of past stock options and 
stock appreciation rather than a response to changing tax rates. 
12. Following Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), I use "avoidance" to mean avoiding the 
tax, but not avoiding the activity For example, choosing leisure is one way to avoid 
paying income tax, but that decision falls under real substitution and not avoidance, 
because the consumption bundle has changed as a result of the tax. 
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13. For income shares updated to 2006, see www.econ.berkeleyedu/~saezJ 
TabFig2006prel.xls. 
14. See CBO (2007). 
15. For a review of the empirical literature, see Giertz (2004). 
16. An income effect variable is also discussed, but is left out of their most-preferred 
specification. 
17. Note that this is a partial equilibrium approach, except to the extent that the ETI 
is influenced by indirect responses to tax changes occurring throughout the economy 
For a general eqUilibrium approach to evaluating changes to tax rates, see CBO (2004). 
18. Tax rate changes at lower brackets can be analyzed analogously by focusing on 
the group of taxpayers facing the marginal rates in the bracket whose rate is chang-
ing. However, with a tax rate increase there will also be a gain (and with a decrease 
in the tax rate there will also be a loss) in revenues from those with incomes in the 
higher brackets. In the section below, I assume that a change in tax rates for a lower 
tax bracket results in no behavioral responses by those in higher tax brackets, 
although it is possible that there could be a response to the income effect. 
19. Again, for more detail on how these responses are calculated, see Saez (2004). 
20. This subgroup is not broken out in IRS (2007). Thus, I assume that individual 
MTRs return to their pre-EGTRRA levels, except that marriage penalty relief is 
extended. 
21. Note that EMTRs and MTRs can be very different from average tax rates, which 
simply represent total taxes divided by total income. For an analysis of average 
income tax rates across income groups and over time, see Pike tty and Saez (2007). 
22. See IRS (2007), table 3.4. 
23. Total tax revenue includes some revenue from capital gains taxes, so long as 
capital gains were taxed at a lower rate than the filers' top rate on ordinary income. 
24. Dollar values are expressed in 2005 terms unless otherwise noted. Compare 
CBO (2008), which reports that extending the cuts in individual rates, along with the 
child tax credit, would lower revenues by $96 billion for 2011 and $152 billion for 
2012. Those estimates account for interactions with the AMT, which are ignored in 
this paper. The CBO numbers also account for some behavioral responses but assume 
that total GDP is not affected by the rate changes. 
25. Total 2005 revenues for this paper are $894.7 billion, which is smaller than total 
2005 individual income taxes because it excludes some capital gains revenues and 
revenues from the Alternative Minimum Tax. 
26. Note that if EGTRRA truly expired, the upper-income limit for the 15 percent 
tax bracket for married filers would fall, raising tax rates over a small range from 15 
to 28 percent. This change is ignored in the analysis. 
27. Again, this assumes no income effects. 
28. Quoted by Laffer (2004, 1-2). That the curve is named for Laffer is an example 
of Stigler'S law of misonomy, which holds that no discovery is named after the person 
who initially makes it. 
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